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It is hard to escape the conclusion from the Francis report into
care atMid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust that the primary
culprit at the heart of this latest NHS scandal is “the culture” of
our healthcare organisations.1 Francis suggests that “a
fundamental culture change is needed” and is clear that he is
seeking a move to something overarching and comprehensive
for the whole NHS.
The Francis inquiry, like the Kennedy inquiry into paediatric
cardiac surgery at Bristol more than a decade earlier,2 has gone
to considerable trouble to try to understand the meaning of
culture in a healthcare context. Yet the subtlety of some of the
supporting evidence to the inquiry has not been matched by the
same degree of nuance in the inquiry’s recommendations about
culture, which are somewhat aspirational and broad brush (box
1). This is a pity, since the research literature has much to say
about the nature of culture and the possibilities for shaping
cultural change to produce benefits.3-5
Unpacking culture
By finding fault with culture and providing prescriptions for
change, Francis is making several assumptions that require
examination. Firstly, he presupposes that we can identify and
assess common aspects of culture,6 as well as identify which
aspects are supportive of or inimical to high quality care.3 4
Secondly, he assumes that these aspects of culture can be
purposely changed, that any changes will lead to improvements,
and that the costs and dysfunctions from such prescriptive
changes will be outweighed by the benefits.4 7 Finally, while
acknowledging that culture may vary “from organisation to
organisation and from department to department,” Francis
emphasises the need for “a positive and common culture
throughout.” This presumes that common cultures are possible
and desirable, even in systems as large and distributed as the
NHS. However, research shows more complex and nuanced
relations between cultures, practices, and outcomes than Francis
implies.
A cultural mosaic
What is organisational culture? The answers are many, complex,
and contested.8 9 But at the heart of many definitions is that
culture consists of the values, beliefs, and assumptions shared
by occupational groups (box 2). These shared ways of thinking
are then translated into common and repeated patterns of
behaviour: patterns of behaviour that are in turn maintained and
reinforced by the rituals, ceremonies, and rewards of everyday
organisational life.3 8 In everyday language, culture is “the way
things are done around here,” together with the shared ways of
thinking that support these norms of practice.3
Many years of organisational research, some of it in healthcare,
have shed light on what we can hope for from cultural analysis
and change.3-10 It is clear that culture in large complex
organisations is rarely uniform.11-13 One study suggested that
NHS staff were united on only two main issues: the need for
care to be based on individual need rather than funding and a
dislike of “constant interference into healthcare provision by
successive UK governments.”13
In reality, cultural divergence of basic beliefs and assumptions
is the norm. Staff may work for the same organisation (a
hospital, say) and employ the same language (talking of care,
quality, evidence, or performance) but the meaning of these
terms can vary between different staff groups. Doctors, for
example, tend to interpret good quality care as treatment
following best evidence, whereas nurses tend to take a more
holistic view, emphasising the alleviation of symptoms and
restoration of health. When even the meaning ascribed to basic
language is not shared, it is hard to see how cultural alignment
is possible.14
Moreover, research has consistently found differences between
staff groups in their fundamental beliefs and assumptions.
Doctors, nurses, andmanagers, for example, take different views
on the balance between a focus on individual patients and the
need for more corporate approaches.15 16 Team based care is also
conceived of differently, with doctors often assuming a more
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Box 1: Core recommendations relating to culture in the Francis report 1
Recommendation 2: The NHS and all who work for it must adopt and demonstrate a shared culture in which the patient is the priority in
everything done. This requires:
• A common set of core values and standards shared throughout the system
• Leadership at all levels from ward to the top of the Department of Health, committed to and capable of involving all staff with those
values and standards
• A system that recognises and applies the values of transparency, honesty, and candour
• Freely available, useful, reliable, and full information on attainment of the values and standards
• A tool or methodology such as a cultural barometer to measure the cultural health of all parts of the system.
Recommendation 185 (and others): Addresses the need for a “focus on culture of caring,” mostly within nursing, with an emphasis on “an
increased focus in nurse training, education and professional development on the practical requirements of delivering compassionate care
in addition to the theory.”
Recommendation 198: Healthcare providers should be encouraged by incentives to develop and deploy reliable and transparent measures
of the cultural health of front-line nursing workplaces and teams, which build on the experience and feedback of nursing staff using a robust
methodology, such as the cultural barometer.
Recommendation 290: The Department of Health should promote a shared positive culture by setting an example in its statements by
being open about deficiencies, ensuring those harmed have a remedy, and making information publicly available about performance at the
most detailed level possible.
Box 2: Defining culture9 10
Culture can be defined as “the pattern of shared basic assumptions—invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to
cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration—that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore,
to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.”10
Many authors talk of culture as operating at three levels:
Level 1: artefacts—The most visible manifestations of culture, including the physical layout of services, established processes of care,
staff rotas and reporting arrangements, dress codes, rituals, reward structures, and ceremonies. This would include, for example, normal
working patterns, the agenda and processes of board meetings, and the arrangements for handling patient complaints and staff concerns
Level 2: beliefs and values—Used to justify particular behaviours, provide a rationale for choosing between alternate courses of action,
and distinguish “right” from “wrong.” Examples include respect for patient autonomy and dignity and the prevailing views on current
individual and collective performance
Level 3: assumptions—The unspoken, largely unconscious, expectations and presuppositions that underpin day to day work. For
example, assumptions about the nature of the caring role, the knowledge and perspectives of patients and relatives, and the relative
role and power of doctors, nurses, and managers.
hierarchical approach, and nurses tending to be more open and
inclusive.13
While it is tempting to focus on subcultures as being aligned to
professional groups, this too is an oversimplification. Those in
hybrid roles (such as clinician-managers) take on some of the
orientations associated with their new roles but never quite shed
all of their original assumptions.16Cultural divergences are also
seen within professional groups—for example, tribal loyalties
and professional identities associated with new subspecialisms
undermined attempts at quality improvement in acute pain
services.17Given such cultural complexity, simply urging people
to think differently is unlikely to over-ride the complex personal
and social forces that shape organisational behaviour.
Our healthcare organisations, then, are better viewed as multiple
(often competing) subcultures, stratified by hierarchy, hospital,
service, ward, team, and, most obviously, occupational group.
Subcultures may, at different times, be driving forces for change,
overt defenders of the status quo, or covert counter cultures
quietly undermining new initiatives. Understanding this cultural
mosaic is essential for any effective cultural diagnosis.
Moreover, it can be difficult to decide whether counter cultures
are stubborn resisters to necessary change, simply defenders of
professional traditions, or perceptive opponents of damaging
new directions. In that sense, conflicts between cultural
subgroups reflect differences in power and legitimacy as well
as outlook, and they can be as much about a struggle for
expression of identity, meaning, and purpose as they are about
competition for resources, autonomy, and control.5 9 17
Striving for cultural uniformity in such complex, dynamic, and
(in all likelihood) conflict ridden organisational arrangements
may be overoptimistic. Exhortations that “patients be at the
centre of the NHS” have been a regular feature of reports,
inquiries, and General Medical Council recommendations for
well over a decade but remain “stubbornly resistant to
adoption.”18
Culture and performance
Cultural diagnoses aside, any relations between organisational
culture and organisational outcomes such as healthcare quality
or patient safety are unlikely to be simple.19 It seems that
organisations do better on those aspects of performance that are
most valued, affirmed, and celebrated within the organisation.20
This means that trade-offs are inevitable and that there can be
no one right culture.9 20
Moreover, it is becoming clear that much as we might like to
think that the direction of travel is from culture to performance
(however that is assessed), judgments on organisational
performance also affect local cultures.9 21 This means that
organisations castigated for “failing” are likely to see a spiral
of decline, demoralisation, and cultural drift.9 It also means that
organisations feted for their success on specific aspects of
performance are likely to reinforce further developments in that
performance, perhaps to the detriment of other areas.9 21 Thus
the pursuit of highly visible success measures (such as
foundation trust status) can lead to the neglect of basic care
processes, as happened in Mid Staffordshire.1
If culture is a shared narrative that staff use to make sense of
their environment—a narrative that also shapes behaviour—then
any narrative about organisational performance is an intimate
part of that cultural backdrop. And it is here that the
organisation’s leaders have a key role, because it is leaders who
interpret quality and performance data and reflect this in their
accounts of achievements and future directions.4 9 22
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Crucially, the policy environment and overarching regulatory
regime provide a context within which senior managers assess
performance and orient their priorities and practices.
Longitudinal data on the NHS suggest that during 2001-08 board
cultures shifted away from an emphasis on organisational
cohesion to prioritising rules based achievement and external
competitiveness.23 In that sense, some of the preoccupations at
Mid Staffordshire revealed at the Francis inquiry were
predictable.9 The Mid Staffordshire board did not pursue
foundation trust status on a whim: it was strongly guided to do
so by prevailing policy imperatives.
Finally, all attempts at cultural manipulation and performance
management are likely to have some unexpected and perhaps
dysfunctional consequences.24 It is disappointing therefore that
while the first Francis report25 identified target driven priorities
as part of the problem, this latest report advocates that healthcare
providers be given incentives to deploy transparent measures
of culture in the workplace.1 Thus culture itself becomes a target
driven priority. When attached to sanctions and rewards, what
Francis termed a “cultural barometer” for healthcare providers
1 seems destined to reinforce rather than reform a culture of
compliance.
Taking on board the evidence
So where does this leave Francis’s cultural prescriptions? We
would do well to tone down our rhetoric around culture, be
cautious about the idea of cultural uniformity, and be sceptical
that top-down prescriptions will bring about the desired changes.
Instead the emphasis needs to be on careful local nurturing,
reaching for gardening metaphors in place of those rooted in
ideas of engineering. Local contexts provide for organic, home
grown approaches that are sensitive to local histories and
preoccupations, and real change requires detailed and sustained
work on the ground.7We also need better understanding of how
the overarching policy arrangements and dynamics either
facilitate locally focused change or frustrate local initiatives by
being too rigid.
Getting the cultural diagnosis right is an essential first step. But
we need to recognise the variety and depth of cultural diversity
in the NHS and make it more visible to the players. Such
recognition needs to be explicit about not just cultural diversity
in terms of language, values, and identity but divergence in
terms of power, authority, status, and reward. Any cultural
prescription for the NHS must deal with this diversity, paying
attention to change within cultural subgroups and attending to
the interactions between cultural subgroups.
Moreover, while recognising the power of cultures to constrain,
individuals still have choices to make, choices for which they
should be held accountable.26Here ideas of “behavioural justice”
might prove helpful.27 Such notions recognise that individuals
have responsibility for their behaviour but can reasonably be
held to account only when they are empowered and have
adequate resources that facilitate appropriate courses of action.
Thus nurses and healthcare assistants might reasonably be
supposed to have less room for self directed culture change than,
say, doctors and managers. Senior managers too are located
differently from policy makers, potentially challenged from
below and oppressed from above.9
Francis pulled back from laying formal blame for organisational
failure at the feet of individuals, although senior trust managers
do receive substantial criticism.28 Moreover, he calls for “all
who work in it [the NHS] to take personal and collective
responsibility to root out poor practice wherever it is found.”
Such general exhortations neglect the varying degrees of
autonomy and empowerment of different players.
Rather than a single set of prescriptions as advocated by Francis,
more balanced strategies that reflect difficult trade-offs and
respect local contingencies may be more appropriate for both
local and national policy (box 3).
We need to examine the linkages between national policies and
local practices, to see how good policy intentions can become
distorted at the local level.29 For example, it can be difficult to
nurture more appropriate accountabilities and learning at local
level if organisations are named and shamed nationally. The
growing cluster of trusts being investigated for high hospital
death rates suggests that “the government may already have
decided that cultural change will be too hard and take too
long.”18
Francis rightly draws attention to the need for “impact
assessments before structural change.”1 His report sets out a
comprehensive set of questions that should be answered for any
new policy directive and draws attention to the importance of
the political backdrop against which all NHS cultural change
takes place. If properly and comprehensively implemented, such
guidance could open up debate on the likely cultural effect of
new policies. Regrettably, the recent experience of the passage
of the Health and Social Care Bill is not reassuring in this regard.
Finally, the evidence presented at the Francis inquiry makes it
clear that we need stronger voices across the system that can
speak against dominant or vested narratives. To be effective,
such advocates will require full access to quantitative and
qualitative data; opportunities to talk with frontline workers,
patients, carers, and relatives; and a mandate to focus entirely
on quality, safety, and patient experience. We also need to
strengthen the support and protection for whistle blowers and
challenge the questionable role of gagging orders.30
Culture may indeed lie at the root of many of the service failings
of complex organisations. Butmore sophisticated understandings
of cultural dynamics, together with an appreciation of the role
of policy in shaping these, are needed if we are to tackle
healthcare failings with any hope of success.
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Box 3: How senior management and national policy can facilitate cultural change 9
One size does not fit all. Cultural change requires a judicious blend of approaches that recognises tensions across several important
dimensions:
• Values (retention/ renewal): many existing values are supportive of high quality care and need to be retained; others need to be
challenged, changed, or replaced
• Accountability (checking/trusting): targets have a role in providing direction, focus, and incentive but high trust organisations can more
easily learn and adapt to multiple competing demands
• Targets for change (external/internal): local ownership of targets may be important; data used formatively rather than summatively
have different effects
• Performance data (hard data/soft intelligence): multiple sources of data, and a capacity and willingness to explore contradictions in
these, are prerequisites for openness to learning
• Blame game (high blame/no blame/just blame): blame is an insidious aspect of many cultures that creeps back in despite overt
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middle management, and of what kind, remains a perennial balancing act.
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